What has happened to the science of logic, to logic as an academic discipline and pursuit? Though the diagnoses do not coincide, many agree that something has gone seriously wrong. Some blame the technique and goal of formalization, or of algebraization and 'model theory'. Some blame the take-over by mathematicians as such. Others blame the period of logical positivism, or a background in Protestant or Jewish religion. Quite a few regard it as a purely psychological question, blaming those who are drawn to logic as a profession as lacking in ordinary linguistic proficiency, or in social and communicative skills, and hence in cultural consciousness.

It was not always so. John Stuart Mill was a logician and a political philosopher, even a politician. Bertrand Russell, whose godfather Mill was, was a logician, a political writer, and a (many-sided) political activist, in his younger years all three at the same time. In 1923 his logic is widely recognized as philosophically important and as threatening to the categorial basis of much of European philosophy including social and political thought. For in that year the renowned French philosopher Jacques Maritain launches an attack on what he calls the 'Logic of Relation', which he ascribes to, and blames on, 'Mr. Russell in particular', and which stands in opposition to the 'Logic of Inherence' (of an individual, in a postulated generic carrier of essential properties, and of those properties in the individual). To say that Maritain's book, *Petite logique*, was influential is an understatement. By 1933 it had been reprinted ten times. At his death in 1973 it was made clear that his influence on the very highest echelons of the Catholic church had been direct and monumental, the then Pope claiming him as his own philosophical inspiration.

However, some time after completing (with A.N. Whitehead) the *Principia mathematica*, Russell, the most widely influential of the logical revisionists in the first part of the century, had abandoned fundamental logical research and had left the scene to a younger man, the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is known that this was preceded by Wittgenstein's philosophy of logical truth as 'tautological'.

And the logic-politics combination disappeared — for a long time. Post hoc, ergo propter hoc? I believe the explanation is more involved. A full explanation also has to cover other eminent politically oriented logicians. For example, why did the impact of the brilliant logical analyses of German idealism by the author of *Progress and Regress in Philosophy*, the German philosopher-mathematician Leonard Nelson, dwindle after their author's death in 1927? Why have German logicians after the last war not taken up his work? It seems there must have been internal contra-political influences on the science of logic in addition to the a-political Wittgenstein.

An answer to these questions would seem to require a systematical analysis of the avowed political thought of more 'technical' philosophers, such as logicians. Such investigations are only beginning to emerge. Alan Ryan's political life of Russell appeared only in 1988,

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preceded in 1987 by Victor Farias’ study of Martin Heidegger. 1989 brought the debate on the philosophy and political thought of Paul de Man and intensified the one on Heidegger, which has recently been enriched with yet another two books. Ray Monk’s recent life of Wittgenstein transcends the interest in Wittgenstein as a single individual, disclosing aspects of the philosophical development in Europe that can be seen to bear on the chasm between political culture and academic logic. One of these is the ‘Genius-or-death’-disposition.

Monk emphasizes Wittgenstein’s assaults on Russell’s philosophy and how the latter felt professionally discouraged by them. Russell, on the other hand, was shocked by Wittgenstein’s professional narrowness and a-political attitude to life. ‘Wittgenstein’s work on logic did nothing, apparently, to improve the rigour of his thought on political questions’.3

Another turn in the philosophy of logic in this century was caused by the Dutch (anti-logicist and) mathematician L.E.J. Brouwer, to whom the ‘logic’ of knowledge assessment was a matter of one-person subjectivism. Whereas the consequences of his views for mathematical proof theory were made the object of thorough debate, their logico-political meaning and influence have been glossed over. A number of data indicate that Brouwer should be added to Wittgenstein in any explanation of the decline of logic as a profession of cultural and political relevance. The comparison has several dimensions:

Logical semiotics: Real truth is self-evident, Brouwer wrote in 1905. Intersubjective understanding requires a type of enforced training that is to be regarded as a negative phenomenon, intellectual products of persons belonging to certain classes of the population are to be excluded from serious consideration, the parties in a controversy do not have rights or obligations, linguistic or other-


wise. Logic is of no avail anywhere.4 The similarities with Wittgenstein are striking.

Politics of race: As Monk explains, Ludwig Wittgenstein immediately was and always remained very much in sympathy with Otto Weininger’s anti-Jew, anti-female, anti-logic book from 1903, which — ‘its epistemology obvious nonsense, its psychology primitive, and its ethical prescriptions odious’ (Monk) — became famous thanks to August Strindberg’s laudation.5 On tyranny, see Monk (1990), p. 353ff. Weininger’s anti-Semitism is complemented, though to my knowledge not by any expression of anti-Semitism, by equally odious expressions of unsparing cruelty in Brouwer’s untranslated book from 1905 (which he remained forever proud of), as well as in his correspondence, finally by his stance and behaviour during the German occupation of the Netherlands in WW II: recommending a ‘Declaration of Loyalty’ to the occupant, Nazi Germany, for which he was for some months expelled from his Amsterdam position as professor after the war. In the same year E.W. Beth was appointed to a new chair as Professor of Logic and the Philosophy of the Exact Sciences at the University of Amsterdam.

Politics of gender: In 1903 the young Otto Weininger writes: ‘Woman is nothing, she is merely matter... she exists only ... as an object.’ In 1905 the young Bertus Brouwer writes: ‘Man ought to avoid and to neglect Woman; but the woman ought to live in the male, regarding herself as being nothing.’ — ‘The burning of widows is a holy ritual; but barbarous Western governments forbid them as barbarous.’ In 1907 Bertie Russell runs for Parliament in the interest of women’s suffrage. To the later dismay of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

The philosophy of Genius: See

4 L.E.J. Brouwer, Leven, kunst en mystiek, Delft, 1905. See pp. 16, 27, 38, 42, 97, and passim.
5 Otto Weininger, Geschlecht und Character, Vienna, 1903; Engl. transl. Sex and Character, 1906.
Brouwer, *op. cit.*, and later discussions of the book and its author. 'Wittgenstein's pursuit of the ideal of true genius has had large consequences in contemporary philosophy,' writes Stuart Hampshire, reviewing Monk's book.⁶

It had been whispered before that Wittgenstein approved of Otto Weininger, on both scores mentioned above, and also that later on he was much impressed by a talk by Brouwer. An analysis of the disappearance of political interest among logicians in terms of their philosophies, and of the connections between them, has been lacking. Monk does everything that he can do to clarify matters as far as Wittgenstein is concerned and the influences on and from Wittgenstein, taking Otto Weininger's statement 'Logic and ethics are fundamentally the same, they are no more than duty to oneself' as a caption for his own book. This is not the place to complete his analysis and dispose of the question, but in an introduction to a book on logic and politics, given Monk's work and Brouwer's untranslated aphoristic early work (1905), something can and should be said. Monk is clearly ignorant of that book, and understandably so, for in 1975 it was not (except for a couple of insignificant stanzas) translated and included in Brouwer's Collected Work.⁷ Yet that book is exceedingly illuminating, and even more so when read in combination with Monk's Life of Wittgenstein. A famous literary work carries the illumination still further. This is Thomas Mann's *Dr. Faustus* from 1947, a novel illustrating a chapter in the history of ideas.

Thomas Mann could have chosen another profession for his fictional composer Adrian Leverkühn. His Dr. Faustus could as well have been rendered as a physician, or physicist, or mathematician, or as a philosopher, for instance a logician. Though any one of these alternative choices of a profession for Dr. Faustus would probably have transcended Mann's descriptive powers, nothing in his famous picture of the European tragedy essentially hinges on Leverkühn's products being musical compositions. The philosopher Wittgenstein and the mathematician Brouwer both exemplify the attitude and standard that is clearly expressed by Mann's Dr. Faustus: *Wenn ich vom Hören höre!* sagte Adrian. *Nach meiner Meinung genügt es völlig, wenn etwas einmal gehört worden ist, nämlich, als der Komponist es erdachte.*⁸

‘When I hear about hearing!’ said Adrian. ‘In my opinion it is quite sufficient when something has been heard once, namely at the moment when the composer conceived it.’ Confronted with this semiotics an affronted listener has lost the game in advance.

What I should like to call ‘the philosophical Dr. Faustus’ is a cluster of culturally induced attitudes with at least these components: dédain towards interpersonal communication, be it verbal or musical, and the position and demands of listeners; towards argumentation; towards politics; ego-centered semiotics; avid aspiration to an assessment of Self as Genius.

Brouwer and Wittgenstein, like Rousseau and Weininger, are extreme and particularly clear cases of professional academic persons whose texts and lives exemplify the philosophical Dr. Faustus. Outside philosophy significant examples are August Strindberg and Knut Hamsun, Brouwer's last fascination. And this is how John Updike summarizes Marcel Proust’s philosophy: ‘The artist, he repeatedly insists, is not another citizen, a social creature with social duties; he is a solitary explorer, a pure egotist.’⁹

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⁸ Thomas Mann, *Dr. Faustus*, 1947, p. 404.
is no difference here with the ethical or logical philosophy of Wittgenstein or of Brouwer.  

In philosophy, statistically the syndrome seems to be so strongly correlated with the feature of denunciation of Jews and of women that this feature should perhaps be included, although Adrian Leverkühn is not outspoken on these two political points. The syndrome is clearly an elaboration of philosophical rationalism, in the technical sense which excludes empiricism.

Bertrand Russell's position as a political and logical philosopher is not based on or otherwise related to his early quest for certainty, or to his vision of logic as fundament for all philosophy. If it is at all supported by anything in his theoretical position, and I believe it is, then it is by his vision of human logic as somehow objective, as there for all, hence as involving other individuals. That vision engenders rather another outlook than Brouwer's or Wittgenstein's on logical semiotics in practical life. Regrettably, Russell did not himself construct or sketch the construction of a bridge from logical theory to political awareness and criticism. Dividing his younger years between the logical foundations of mathematics, political writing, political action, and profound love affairs with women, he could hardly be expected to find time for the bridge problem. It therefore was devastating for the political possibilities of logic as a science that two of the most influential critics of objectivist logic were anti-political to the extent of supporting (as Brouwer) or condoning downright cruelty (as Wittgenstein, re the Moscow processes).

So what did happen to the study of logic to produce the chasm between logic as a science and the problems of political culture? By now it seems quite clear that the philosophical Dr. Faustus has been far more momentous than the use of mathematical methods or association with positivist epistemology, or the innate characters of individual logicians, or the method of formalization as such.

There is no need to offend readers and authors by forcing upon them a further classification of topics and opinions than that which is attempted in the division of this book into three parts and a certain order of presentation. A few general remarks is all I shall venture. As the reader will see, some of the authors who here offer their thoughts on logic and politics apply their logical expertise to problems of a political nature straightforward. Others are aiming towards a theoretically improved logic, a science that in its very fundamentals is attuned to political reality, thereby bringing more individuals, in less time and with less educational expenditure, to proceed logically in matters political - to sharpen their ability to analyse the political developments and ideas facing them and to improve their own.

Some hold contemporary a-political formal logic to be a science that has been carried ad absurdum. Recommending a complete break they pursue a strictly informal approach. Others have retained various degrees of belief in the potential of formalized logic, or in the potential of certain branches thereof, or in the history of its development, and are unwilling to

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10 Updike (op. cit.), referring to literature, speaks of 'the modernist pose of self-satisfying creation'. He quotes Gustave Flaubert — an early hero of Brouwer's, see his (1905) — on the duty of the novelist: ‘Between the crowd and ourself, no bond exists’, and he quotes Marcel Proust: ‘To be altogether true to his spiritual life an artist must remain alone and not be prodigal of himself even to disciples.’ Says Updike: 'The religious tone of classic modernism, its austerity and fanaticism, strike us as excessive. Its close imitation of European Catholicism seems puzzling, now that the vessel of Christianity is a century more depleted.'

11 Except perhaps for the ideology of genius, all the characteristics of the philosophical Dr. Faustus are constitutive of the ideology of Carl Schmitt, the influential 'decisionist' German political philosopher. See Nicolaus Sombart, *Die deutschen Männer und ihre Feinde* (1991).
abolish the method of formalization for systematizing and meta-logical tasks even when these are carried out in the service of political awareness, construction and criticism. Some are interested in a critique of the logics that actually underlie the political philosophies of daily life and the academic political philosophies that nourish them. Whatever their differences, the thought of every one of them is consistently as far from the philosophical

Dr. Faustus as can be. In fact they were hand-picked for that purpose.¹²

Though we may not experience it we can still look forward to the day when the cutting edge of academic logic, formal or informal, is looked for in its contribution to political thought and political culture.

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¹² J.-P. van Bendegem's important paper, 'Logic and Decision Theory — Can we learn from the empirical turn in the latter?,' which would fit naturally into Part III of the present volume, is published in the volume From an Empirical Point of View, edited by E.M. Barth, J. van Dormael, and F. Vandamme (1992). The contributions by R.T.P. Wiche on forms of negation and by J. Hoepelman/A. van Hoof on default logic are to be presented in Wiche's and Van Hoof's forthcoming doctoral dissertations. Also forthcoming is a paper on logic versus the attribution of guilt in political discussions, based on the talk by G. van Benthem van den Bergh on 'guilt-causes' and written jointly by him and E.M. Barth.